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STUDENT NOTES/COMMENTS
Leal Garcia v. Texas: A Foreign National’s
Fight With Federalism
Courtney C. Karnes*
I. INTRODUCTION
“A rule that nullifies treaties as domestic law allows the
United States to sign international agreements and purport to
support individual rights, while simultaneously divesting those
agreements of any ability to actually give rights to individuals.”1
Over the past one hundred years, the United States has established itself as an international superpower; this is due in part to
victory in two World Wars, and signing onto numerous international treaties including the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.2 Since 2010, the international community’s views on the
United States are even more positive than in years past.3 Would
domestic citizens and international countries believe the United
States to be a reputable country that abides by its international
obligations—with a judiciary that faithfully upholds the laws of
the land—if they knew the United States Supreme Court allowed
the United States government to renege on its international obligation while simultaneously sentencing a detained foreign
national to death?4 The Court placed the United States’ reputation
* Article and Comments Editor, University of Miami Inter-American Law
Review; J.D. 2013, University of Miami School of Law; M.M. 2012, University of
Miami Frost School of Music; B.S. 2010, George Mason University. I dedicate this
paper to my loving family—Tim, Michelle and Caitlin Karnes—for their constant
support and love. Special thanks to Professor Jill Barton for her guidance and
direction in the creation of this article.
1. Aya Gruber, An Unintended Casualty of the War on Terror, 27 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 299, 313 (2011).
2. See generally Samuel P. Huntington, The Lonely Superpower, 78 FOREIGN AFF.
35, 37 (1999) (“The United States, of course, is the sole state with preeminence in
every domain of power—economic, military, diplomatic, ideological, technological, and
cultural—with the reach and capabilities to promote its interests in virtually every
part of the world.”).
3. Global Views of United States Improve While Other Countries Decline,
WORLDPUBLICOPINION.ORG (Apr. 18, 2010), http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/
articles/views_on_countriesregions_bt/660.php.
4. See Leal Garcia v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 2866 (2011) (Breyer, J. dissenting)
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on the line when it did just that by denying Humberto Leal Garcia’s habeas corpus petition in July 2011—despite available remedies that could have saved the man.5
As a Vienna Convention signatory since 1969, the United
States’ obligation to inform detained foreign nationals of their
international right to contact their home country’s consulate, as
required by Article 36 of the Convention, was clear.6 Despite this
obligation, in 2004 Mexico brought suit against the United States
in the International Court of Justice (hereinafter “ICJ”) for failing
to inform detained foreign nationals of their right to contact their
consulate. This lawsuit likely resulted from the execution of several Mexican nationals in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s.7 The
class action Case Concerning Avena and Other Nationals, involved
fifty-two Mexican nationals who were tried, convicted, and sentenced to death in courts throughout the United States.8 Consular
access was denied to every party and consequently, the ICJ determined that the United States had violated the Vienna Convention.9 The ICJ decision recognized this rights violation of the
Mexican citizens and ordered the United States to hold hearings
to review and reconsider their cases, thereby determining whether
the lack of consular access affected outcomes in individual cases.10
In an attempt to satisfy the ICJ ruling, then-President Bush
issued the “President’s Memorandum” ordering state courts to
review and reconsider the cases of the Avena named parties.11 The
State of Texas refused to reconsider Medellin’s case for consular
access violations, claiming there was no obligation to follow the
President’s Memorandum.12
(arguing that Leal’s execution would place the United States in irreparable breach of
its obligations under international law).
5. See id.
6. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77,
T.I.A.S. No. 6820 (entered into force with respect to the United States of America
December 24, 1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
7. Case Concerning Avena and Other Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12
(Mar. 31).
8. Id. at 23.
9. Id. at 71.
10. Id. The ICJ ruling did not state if any cases should be reviewed posthumously
for any defendants who may have died or been executed during the pendency of the
case.
11. Memorandum from President George W. Bush to the U.S. Att’y Gen. (Feb. 28,
2005), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/
02/20050228-18.html.
12. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504 (2008) (“In the [Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals’] view, neither the Avena decision nor the President’s Memorandum
was ‘binding federal law.’”).
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The United States Supreme Court affirmed Texas’s refusal.13
In its 2008 Medellin v. Texas decision, the Supreme Court deemed
rulings handed down from the ICJ as inapplicable in state courts
absent Congressional legislation.14 The Court concluded that the
Vienna Convention ratified by the United States in 1969, was a
non-self-executing treaty and accordingly required enactment of
Congressional legislation to compel state compliance with the ICJ
decision.15 The Court also specifically removed Presidential
authority to force state court compliance with the ICJ’s ruling in
Avena.16 According to the Supreme Court’s ruling, in order to
require state court action, Congress needed to take affirmative
steps and enact legislation making the ICJ ruling binding on
domestic courts.17 At the time Medellin’s case was argued in 2008,
Congress spoke through silence.18
Two years later, Congress ended its silence.19 Following
Medellin, Vermont Senator Patrick Leahy introduced legislation
to bind state courts with ICJ decisions.20 Subsequent to the bill’s
introduction, Leal, another Mexican national named in the Avena
decision, petitioned the Supreme Court for a stay of execution. He
asked the court to allow him to live until Congress decided
whether to pass the bill.21 The court denied the stay of execution in
a 5-4 decision, effectively dismissing concerns about irreparable
harm to the United States’ international relations with Mexico.22
The majority based their opinion on the stance that the Court’s job
is to issue judgments based on what the law is, not what the law
eventually may be.23 The majority descriptor ignored a legal remedy that would have enabled the Court to stay Leal’s execution.24
The four dissenting justices wished to stay the execution for a spe13. Id.
14. Id. at 508. Jose Ernesto Medellin was a party named in the Avena decision.
Id. at 498.
15. Id. at 504-19 (analyzing both the enforceability of ICJ rulings and the Vienna
Convention in Section II of the Court’s opinion).
16. Id. at 523-32 (analyzing the President’s authority to preempt state laws
without Congressional legislation in Section III of the Court’s opinion).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See Consular Notification Compliance Act of 2011, S. 1194, 112th Cong.
(2011), GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s112-1194 (last
visited Oct. 13, 2011) [hereinafter Consular Notification Compliance Act].
20. See id.
21. Leal Garcia v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 2866, 2867 (2011).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. (Breyer, J. dissenting).
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cific amount of time to give Congress time to pass the pending
legislation.25 The dissent recognized the imminent harm to the
United States’ foreign relations with Mexico, and stated the Court
should take steps to protect its potential jurisdiction.26 This comment discusses why the dissenting justices should have prevailed
and why the majority’s death sentence harmed the United States’
foreign relations with Mexico.
28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), “the All Writs Act” and its subsequent
case law creates a line of precedent allowing the Court to issue
writs to protect its potential jurisdiction, offering an avenue for
the Court to issue the stay on Leal’s execution.27 Specifically, if
Senator Leahy’s bill passes, the ICJ’s ruling becomes binding on
the States; the Texas Courts will be required to review Leal’s conviction.28 Any refusal to do so will be a violation of Federal law and
Leal will have a remedy in the Federal courts.29 According to
Leal’s submitted briefs, consular access would have weighed heavily on his post-arrest actions.30 The Court’s ability to protect its
potential jurisdiction “ ‘is in the nature of appellate jurisdictions of
the appellate court where an appeal is not pending, but may later
be perfected.’ ”31 In this case, the Court’s failure to protect its
potential jurisdiction led to Leal’s death.32 The United States
Supreme Court allowed the State of Texas to execute Medellin due
to Congressional silence.33 Yet, the Supreme Court executed Leal
while Congress was finding its voice.34 The Supreme Court’s inconsistency, along with its failure to utilize all options available to it,
has the potential to irreparably harm international relations
between the United States and Mexico.35
Multiple international law and federalism considerations led
25. Id.
26. See Gruber, supra note 1, at 310.
27. See generally Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Removal Jurisdiction and the All
Writs Act, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 401, 433-34 (1999).
28. See Consular Notification Compliance Act, S.1194, 112th Cong. (2011),
GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s112-1194 (last visited
Oct. 13, 2011).
29. See generally id.
30. Brief for the Gov’t. of the United Mex. States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, Leal Garcia v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 2866 (2011) (Nos. 11-5001 (11A1), 11-5002
(11A2), and 11-5081 (11A21)) 2011 WL 2581860 at *23.
31. Fed. Trade Comm’n. v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 603 (1966) (quoting Ex
parte Crane, 5 Pet. 190, 193 (1832)).
32. See Leal Garcia v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 2866, 2866 (2011).
33. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 492, 507 (2008).
34. See Leal, 131 S. Ct. at 2866.
35. Brief for the Gov’t. of the United Mex. States, supra note 30, at *23.
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to the death of Humberto Leal-Garcia—this comment outlines the
history of all the factors in play. This comment is divided into five
parts—Part I provides a brief description of the issues at play;
Part II discusses international law, including the Vienna Convention as a non-self-executing treaty and the Case Concerning Avena
and Other Mexican Nationals; Part III analyzes domestic actions,
including “The President’s Memorandum,” Medellin v. Texas and
Leal v. Texas; and Part IV will discuss Mexican foreign relations
with both the United States and the State of Texas. The Comment
will end with Part V’s analysis of why the Court should have
issued a writ for potential jurisdiction staying Leal’s execution.

II. INTERNATIONAL LAW
The United States has reputably established itself internationally and is at the forefront of many international issues.36 The
actions of the United States have worldwide impact, largely due to
victory in World Wars I and II and the devastation these wars left
upon the worldwide economy, leading to America possessing one
of the highest growing gross domestic products in the world.37 This
economic power placed the United States at the forefront of many
post-war international issues.38 Accordingly, many foreign nations
have entered into treaties with the United States, naturally
assuming that all agreed upon obligations will be enforced/met/
upheld.39 However, as decisions discussed herein show, this is not
always the case.

A.

The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations as a
Non-Self Executing Treaty

The Vienna Convention imposed a strict requirement on both
federal and state governments that all arrested foreign nationals
36. See generally Global Views of United States Improve While Other Countries
Decline, supra note 3, at 1.
37. See generally Treaty of Versailles, 1919 UNITED STATES HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL
MUSEUM, http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005425 (last visited
Apr. 7, 2012); see also Richard Overy, World War Two: How the Allies Won, BBC
HISTORY (Nov. 02, 2011) http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/how_the_
allies_won_01.shtml (last visited Apr. 7, 2012); GDP (current US$), THE WORLD BANK,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD/countries?display=graph
(last visited Apr. 7, 2012).
38. See generally Global Views of United States Improve While Other Countries
Decline, supra note 3.
39. See generally Treaties in Force [TIF], U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, http://www.
state.gov/s/l/treaty/tif/index.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2012).
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have consular access after arrest.40 When signing a treaty, it is
recognized that, “[e]very signatory nation to a treaty must grapple
with the extent to which it will incorporate international law into
its national legal system.”41 The Vienna Convention forced individual states to determine how to incorporate the consular access
rule into their policing procedures.42 The United States’ legislative
system is internationally atypical, particularly when dealing with
international treaties, because of the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution,43 as evidenced by Askura v. City of
Seattle, in which the Supreme Court concluded that, “the
Supremacy Clause gives treaties the status of federal statutory
law.44 Ultimately, the Court found that the Constitution made
treaties part of “our law.”45
American legislation relies on the intent of the drafter and
the language provided to determine whether a treaty automatically becomes federal law (known as a self-executing treaty) or
whether it requires Congressional enactment of legislation to
become effective (a non-self-executing treaty).46 In the United
States, the type of treaty enacted has a direct effect on how it is
incorporated into the laws of the United States.47 Thus, this selfexecution doctrine neatly divides American treaties into two
40. Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 36(1)(a) (“consular officers shall be free
to communicate with nationals of the sending State and to have access to them.
Nationals sending State shall have the same freedom with respect to communication
with and access to consular officers to the sending state. . .”); See id., supra note 6, at
art. 36(1)(b) (“if he so requests the component authorities of the receiving State shall,
without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State, if within its consular
district, a national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody
pending trial or is detained in any other manner.”).
41. See Gruber, supra note 1, at 310.
42. MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32390, VIENNA
CONVENTION ON CONSULAR RELATIONS: OVERVIEW OF U.S. IMPLEMENTATION AND
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (ICJ) INTERPRETATION OF CONSULAR NOTIFICATION
REQUIREMENTS (2004), at CRS5 (“[T]he State Department has attempted to ensure
state and local compliance with Article 36 by regularly distributing manuals, pocket
cards, and training resources to state and local officials concerning the consular
notification obligations owed under the Vienna Convention. These materials
characterize Vienna Convention obligations as “binding on federal, state, and local
government officials to the extent that they pertain to matters within such officials’
competence,” and stress that “in all cases, the [arrested or detained] foreign national
must be told of the right of consular notification and access.”).
43. See Gruber, supra note 1, at 311.
44. Asukura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341-42 (1924); see also Gruber, supra
note 1, at 311.
45. Gruber, supra note 1, at 311.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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groups: those that are self-executing and those that are not.48 Selfexecuting treaties are automatically ratified upon Presidential
signature, while non-self-executing treaties require ratifying legislation to be enforceable.49 “When ‘parties [engage] to perform a
particular act. . .the legislature must execute the contract before it
can become a rule for the Court.’ ”50
Both the United States and the United Mexican States agreed
to the binding terms of the Vienna Convention, the United States
ratifying in 1969.51
In 1963, the United States signed the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations, a United Nations treaty designed to
codify existing international customary law with regard to
consular ‘relations, privileges and immunities.” Though the
preamble to the treaty specifically states that “the purpose
of such privileges and immunities is not to benefit individuals but to ensure the efficient performance of functions by
consular posts on behalf of their respective States,’ Article
36(1)(b) nonetheless provides that an individual foreign
national arrested in a signatory state has the right to free
communication with and access to his consulate.52
“The United States has a strong interest in complying with its
Article 36 obligations in order to maintain international integrity
and to protect its citizen abroad.”53
When the United States violated the Vienna Convention by
denying detained Mexican nationals consular access, Mexico’s
only option was to file suit in the International Court of Justice,
expecting a binding ICJ ruling.54 Both the United States and Mex48. Id.
49. See Gruber, supra note 1, at 314 (citing Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253,
314 (1820)).
50. Id. at 314.
51. See Vienna Convention, supra note 6.
52. Sarah M. Ray, Domesticating International Obligations: How to Ensure U.S.
Compliance with the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1729,
1734 (2003); see Stephanie L. Metz, Note, Medellin v. Dretke and Medellin v. Texas:
International Law Can’t Mess With Texas, 36 CAP. U. L. REV. 1131, 1134 (2007)
(“Article 36 states that its purpose is to facilitate consular function, not to benefit
individuals: the provision is to be construed ‘with a view to facilitating the exercise of
consular functions relating to nationals of the sending State.”).
53. Nancy Alexander, Comment, Saved by the States? The Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations, Federal Government Shortcomings, and Oregon’s Rescue, 15
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 819, 825 (2011).
54. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on
Disputes, T.I.A.S. No. 6820, 21 U.S.T. 77, 1969 WL 97928 (U.S. Treaty 1969)
(establishing the ICJ as the jurisdiction for disputes arising between signatories)
(hereinafter “Optional Protocol.”)
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ico also ratified the Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory
Settlement of Disputes, which gives the ICJ jurisdiction over disputes “ ‘arising out of the interpretation or application’ ” of the
Vienna Convention.55 Under this framework, parties provide the
ICJ the authority to hear cases arising under the treaty. Without
it, the ICJ would not have compulsory jurisdiction over the Consular Convention claims.56 When the Vienna Convention was submitted for ratification, according to the Senate’s report, the treaty
was “entirely self-executive” and did not require additional legislation to become effective.57 However, the Supreme Court, in
Medellin v. Texas, discussed infra Section III.B, concluded that
the Vienna Convention was non-self-executing.58

B.

Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican
Nationals

Mexico successfully sued the United States for violations of
consular access in the ICJ as a result of their frustration with the
United States’ disregard for necessary consular access.59 The ICJ
ultimately ruled in Mexico’s favor, determining that the United
States’ ignorance of consular access was inexcusable. All signatories to the Vienna Convention are expected to abide by the consular access requirement, which ensures that detained foreign
nationals are treated fairly in an unknown legal system, understand their legal rights, and understand any agreements they
enter into with foreign governments.60 Consular officials are
brought into the diplomatic landscape to “provide governmental
55. See Metz, supra note 52, at 1135. The United States has since pulled out of the
Optional Protocol; however, it was a signatory when the ICJ issued its ruling and
therefore, is still bound by the agreement in light of the Avena decision.
56. See Metz, supra note 52, at 1135.
57. See Ray, supra note 52, at 1736; see also Reynaldo Anaya Valencia et al.,
Avena and the World Court’s Death Penalty Jurisdiction in Texas: Addressing the
Odd Notion of Texas’s Independence from the World, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 455,
498-99 (2005) (“Since its ratification, the State Department has regarded the Vienna
Convention as self-executing.”).
58. 522 U.S. 491, 499 (2008).
59. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on
Disputes, supra note 55, at Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement
of Disputes, art. 1 (establishing the ICJ as the jurisdiction for disputes between
signatories in regards to the interpretation or application of the Convention); see also
Case Concerning Avena and Other Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, ¶¶ 1, 153
(Mar. 31).
60. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on
Disputes, supra note 55 (establishing the ICJ as the jurisdiction for disputes arising
between signatories).
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representation in commercial and individual matters in foreign
countries, and to handle other matters of national interests that
might not rise to the level of matters of state.”61
The United States government was surely aware that both
federal and state officials must inform detained foreign nationals
of their right to consular assistance, per the Vienna Convention.62
“Nevertheless, sending nations, including Mexico, have found it
difficult to obtain remedies for imprisoned foreign nationals, particularly in death penalty cases, through the U.S. court system.”63
In its amicus brief on behalf of Leal, the Government of the
United Mexican States argued, “When such disagreements have
arisen, Mexico and the United States have attempted to resolve
them amicably and constructively . . . Both countries have benefitted from peaceful judicial settlement of their disputes.”64
In 2003, Mexico brought suit in the ICJ following the execution of three Mexican nationals—all three cases involving failure
to notify of the right to consular access.65 Mexico’s formal complaint accused the United States of the following:
. . . arresting, detaining, trying, convicting, and sentencing
the 52 Mexican nationals on death row . . . violat[ing] its
international legal obligations to Mexico, in its own right
and in the exercise of its right to diplomatic protection of its
nationals, by failing to inform, without delay the 52 Mexican nationals after their arrest of their right to consular
notification and access under Article 36(1) (b) of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, and by depriving Mexico of its right to provide consular protection and the 52
nationals’ right to receive such protection as Mexico would
provide under Article 36(1) (a) and (c) of the Convention
. . . .66

The Court’s pertinent findings were:
(1) “that, by not informing, without delay upon their detention, the 51 Mexican nationals . . . of their rights under
Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention . . .
the United States of America breached the obligations
61. See Valencia, supra note 57, at 476.
62. See Valencia, supra note 57, at 477-78 (emphasis added).
63. See Valencia, supra note 57, at 478.
64. Brief for the Gov’t of the United Mex. States, supra note 30, at 9-10.
65. See Valencia, supra note 57, at 487-88.
66. Case Concerning Avena and Other Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 at ¶
14 (Mar. 31).
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incumbent upon it . . .”;67
(2) “that, by not notifying the appropriate Mexican consular
post without delay of the detention of the 49 Mexican
nationals . . . and thereby depriving the United Mexican
States of the right, in a timely fashion, to render the assistance provided for by the Vienna Convention to the individuals concerned, the United States of America breached its
obligations incumbent upon it . . .”;68
(3) “the United States of America deprived the United Mexican States of the right, in a timely fashion, to communication with and have access to those nationals and to visit
them in detention, and thereby breached the obligations
incumbent on it . . .”;69 and
(4) “that, in relation to the 34 Mexican nationals . . . the
United States of America deprived the United Mexican
States of the right, in a timely fashion, to arrange for legal
representation of those nationals, and thereby breached the
obligations incumbent upon it.”70

The ICJ issued the following orders:
(1) “that the appropriate reparation in this case consists in
the obligation of the United States of America to provide,
by means of its own choosing, review and reconsideration of
the convictions and sentences of the Mexican nationals . . .
by taking account both of the violation of the rights . . .”;71
(2) the ICJ “[t]akes note of the commitment undertaken by
the United States of America to ensure implementation of
the specific measures adopted in performance of its obligations under . . . the Vienna Convention; and finds that this
commitment must be regarded as meeting the request by
the United Mexican States for guarantees and assurances
of non-repetition”;72 and
(3) “that, should Mexican nationals nonetheless be sentenced to severe penalties, without their right under Article
36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Convention having been
respected, the United States of America shall provide, by
means of its own choosing, review and reconsideration of
the conviction and sentence, so as to allow full weight to be
given to the violation of the rights set forth in the Conven67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at ¶ 153.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
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tion . . . .”73

The ICJ reiterated that the United States had breached its independently undertaken international obligations.74 The United
States ratified the Vienna Convention with full knowledge that
detained foreign nationals were to be given access to consular aid
following any arrest.75 The United States breached its international obligations in four different types of circumstances, affecting the lives of at least fifty Mexican nationals and their families.76

III. DOMESTIC ACTIONS
A.

The President’s Memorandum

“Under the U.N. Charter and Restatement of Foreign Law,
the United States is bound to comply with the decisions of the
ICJ.”77 Following the Avena decision, President Bush issued a
memorandum, entitled “The President’s Memorandum,” in which
he ordered states to reconsider the convictions of defendants
named in the Avena judgment.78 In an effort to discharge the
United States’ international obligation under the Avena judgment, the President ordered that the “[s]tate [ ] courts give effect
to the decision in accordance with general principles of comity in
cases filed by the 51 Mexican nationals addressed in that decision.”79 The President’s Memorandum attempted to compel states
to comply with the ICJ’s ruling.80 Texas, however, refused to comply with the President’s Memorandum, and likewise refused to
reconsider the cases of Mexican nationals sentenced to death in
Texas.81 The President’s Memorandum ultimately sparked international controversy and put federalism at odds with foreign
relations.82
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See Vienna Convention for Consular Relations, supra note 6, at art. 36.
76. See Avena (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. at ¶ 153 (asserting that the United States
violated the rights of detained foreign nationals by not informing the detainees about
their right to consular access, by not informing the consular officials that Mexican
nationals were detained, by delaying the consulate access to the detainees, and by
delaying the assignment of legal counsel to the detainees).
77. Ray, supra note 52, at 1769.
78. See Memorandum from President George W. Bush to the U.S. Att’y Gen.,
supra note 11.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504 (2008).
82. See id. at 491.
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Medellin v. Texas

This federalism versus international relations tension
reached a boiling point when the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear Medellin v. Texas.83 Prior to the ICJ’s Avena decision,
José Ernesto Medellin, a Mexican national, was convicted of and
sentenced to death for participating in the gang rape and murder
of two teenage girls.84 After his conviction, he claimed the state
had violated his right to contact the Mexican consulate in violation of the Vienna Convention.85 In Medellin v. Dretke, he petitioned the Supreme Court for habeas corpus.86 In its 5-4 decision,
the Court concluded Medellin still had state court appeals available to him and remanded the case for further consideration.87 His
case returned to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, where he
argued for reconsideration of his conviction in light of the 2004
Avena decision.88 He argued that the Vienna Convention granted
him an individual right that must be respected by the state courts,
a proposition the Supreme Court had yet to decide on following
Sanchez-Lamas v. Oregon, a 2006 decision involving the extent to
which the Supreme Court had power to impose certain remedies
on state courts under the Vienna Convention.89
Medellin also argued that the Court was required to follow
then-President Bush’s “President’s Memorandum” instructing
state courts to comply with the ICJ ruling requiring states to
rehear and reconsider the cases of the Avena parties, including
Medellin.90 Medellin claimed that the Constitution granted the
President broad power to ensure that international treaties are
enforced, and that such power extended to state court
proceedings.91
Rejecting Medellin’s assertions, in a 6-3 decision92 the Court
held that the treaty was not self-executing, and accordingly, did
83. Id.
84. Ex parte Medellin, 223 S.W.3d 315, 321 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
85. Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 274 (5th Cir. 2004).
86. Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 662-64 (2005).
87. Id. at 666-67.
88. Ex parte Medellin, 223 S.W.3d at 321.
89. Id. at 330-331; see also Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 343 (2006);
Mary D. Hallerman, Medellin v. Texas: The Treaties that Bind, 43 U. RICH. L. REV.
797, 802 (2009) (discussing Sanchez, asserting “the Court stated that ICJ judgments
cannot dictate domestic court opinions and noted the importance of procedural
defaults in the United States’ judicial system”).
90. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 523 (2008).
91. Id.
92. Id.
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not bind state courts.93 Generally, in order for treaties to bind
state courts, Congress must pass enabling legislation and thus
enact the treaty provisions into law.94
“The Article is not a directive of domestic courts. It does not
provide that the United States ‘shall’ or ‘must’ comply with
an ICJ decision, not indicate that the Senate that ratified
the U.N. Charter intended to vest ICJ decisions with immediate legal effect in domestic courts. Instead, ‘[t]he words of
Article 94. . .call upon governments to take certain
action.”95
The court concluded that, “given the absence of congressional legislation, that the non-self-executing treaties at issue here did not
‘expressly or impliedly’ vest the President [with] unilateral
authority to make them self-executing.”96 The decision left many
issues unclear or unresolved, including Congress’s options for giving domestic effect to the ICJ ruling.97 The Medellin decision has
been called the “case that launched a thousand law review articles,” indicating the profession’s general uncertainty over what
exactly it was that the Court’s ruling meant for the various parties
involved.98 While the decision gave a blanket statement about the
Vienna Convention, it provided no further direction as to where
the legislature was headed next.99 Congress was silent in Medellin’s case, but what constituted Congressional action? Where did
the line start? Where did the line end? This gray area created by
the Medellin majority led to a decidedly harsh dissent in 2011’s
Leal Garcia v. Texas.100

C.

Leal Garcia v. Texas

If Medellin dented the United States’ international reputation
and relations with Mexico, Leal Garcia v. Texas nearly destroyed
relations completely. In 1995, Humberto Leal Garcia was convicted and sentenced to death by a Texas court for the brutal
assault, rape, and murder of a teenage girl.101 Leal Garcia was
93. Id. at 526.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 508.
96. Id. at 527.
97. See Edward W. Duffy, Note, The Avena Act: An Option to Induce State
Implementation of Consular Notification Rights After Medellin, 98 GEO. L.J. 795, 796
(2010).
98. See Metz, supra note 52, at 1131.
99. See Medellin, 552 U.S. 491.
100. See Leal Garcia v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 2866 (2011).
101. Id. at 2867.
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questioned by police, subsequently providing two signed statements and consenting to a police search of his home.102 Throughout his entire time in custody, the Texas authorities failed to
notify Leal Garcia of any right to contact the Mexican consulate.103
In the sixteen years following his original conviction, Leal
Garcia vigorously tried, by all legal means at his disposal, to prove
his innocence in the Texas Courts, including filing several habeas
corpus petitions.104 In the midst of his federal habeas corpus petitions, Leal Garcia became a named party in the Avena litigation.105
In his final petition to the Supreme Court, Leal Garcia sought a
stay of execution, arguing that the United States Congress was
considering legislation that would make the Avena decision binding on state courts.106 Around this time, Senator Patrick Leahy
introduced a bill, the Consular Notification and Compliance Act
(“CNCA”) that would have forced state courts, including those in
Texas, to reconsider Leal Garcia’s conviction in compliance with
the Avena decision.107 Both the United States and Mexico peti102. Id.
103. See Leal Garcia v. Thaler, 68 F. App’x 85 (5th Cir. 2011).
104. Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Application for Stay
of Execution, Leal Garcia v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 2866 (2011) (Nos. 11-5001 (11A1)), 2011
WL 2743201, at *1 (“Since his conviction sixteen long years ago, Leal Garcia has filed
a direct appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, three state habeas
applications, three federal habeas petitions, seven petitions for certiorari to review
this Court, four appeals to the Fifth Circuit, a Chapter 64 proceeding in state court
seeking to compel access to further DNA testing, a Section 1983 lawsuit in federal
court, and a lawsuit in state court under the Texas Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) challenging the Texas lethal-injection protocol. Furthermore, since his
execution date was set in November 2010, Leal Garcia alone has filed numerous
motions and pleadings to his Section 1983 suit, an appeal of that lawsuit, a Rule 60(b)
motion seeking to reopen his second federal petition, an appeal of APA suit to the
Texas Supreme Court, a third federal habeas petition, an appeal of the Fifth Circuit’s
dismissal of that petition, and a petition for an original writ of habeas corpus—all in
addition to the instant petition for certiorari.”).
105. See Case Concerning Avena and Other Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12
(Mar. 31); see also Leal Garcia, 68 F. App’x 85.
106. Leal Garcia v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 2866, 2867 (2011). (Leal Garcia also contended
“that the Due Process Clause prohibit[ed] Texas from executing him while such
legislation is under consideration,” but the argument was quickly dismissed by
Justice Scalia: “The Due Process Clause does not prohibit a State from carrying out a
lawful judgment in light of unenacted legislation that might someday authorize a
collateral attack on that judgment.”).
107. Id.; Consular Notification and Compliance Act, S. 1194, 112th Cong. (2011).
The proposed legislation would have given federal courts jurisdiction to review the
cases of death row inmates who were not afforded access to their country of origin’s
consulate after their arrest, a right which they are guaranteed under the Vienna
Convention. Permits an individual who is arrested, detained, or held for trial (but not
yet convicted and sentenced) on a charge that would expose the individual to a capital
sentence to raise a claim of a violation of the Convention or a comparable provision of
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tioned the Supreme Court on Leal Garcia’s behalf, asking the
Court to stay the execution.108 The United States’ amicus brief
expressly asked the Court to stay the execution in support of
“future jurisdiction to review the judgment in the proceeding.”109
In an unsigned 5-4 decision delivered by Justice Scalia, the
Supreme Court rejected Leal Garcia’s request, stating the Court’s
“task is to rule on what the law is, not what it might eventually
be.”110 The Court ignored the dissent’s concerns of international
consequences, instead asserting that “Congress evidently did not
find these consequences sufficiently grave to prompt its enactment of implementing legislation, and we will follow the law as
written by Congress.”111
The Justice Breyer-authored dissent starkly disagreed with
the majority’s decision to deny a stay of execution.112 The dissent
correctly forecasted that the majority’s decision would destroy
more than the life of a man; it would work to undermine over a
hundred years of positive history, harming to a degree the postwar international respect the United States enjoyed with other
countries.113 Justice Breyer, understanding the inevitable international consequences, wished to stay the execution until September, allowing Congress to do its job and preserving international
relations with Mexico.114 Staying the execution for a specific period
of time would force Congress to act quickly in deciding whether to
enact legislation binding state courts with ICJ decisions.115 The
dissent argued that Leal Garcia’s conviction was never reconsidered at the state level to determine whether failure to contact the
consulate on his behalf was in fact harmless error.116 The dissent
also argued that the “international court made clear that Leal
Garcia [was] entitled to a certain procedure, namely a hearing,”
a bilateral international agreement addressing consular notification and access, at a
reasonable time after the individual becomes aware of the violation, before the court
of jurisdiction. Requires: (1) notification of the appropriate consulate by the detaining
authority and consular access to the individual, and (2) the court to postpone any
proceedings if necessary to allow for consular access and assistance. Authorizes the
court to conduct evidentiary hearings to resolve factual issues.”).
108. Leal Garcia, 131 S. Ct. at 2867.
109. Id.
110. Leal Garcia, 131 S. Ct. at 2867.
111. Id. at 2868.
112. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined
this dissent.
113. See id. at 2868-69.
114. Id. at 2870.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 2869.
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which he had yet to receive and which would satisfy the United
States’ international obligations in light of the Avena decision.117
The Court normally gives deference to the Executive in foreign affairs matters and, “it has ordinarily given [the President’s]
view significant weight in such matters.”118 The Leal Garcia
majority claimed “[w]e have no apparent authority to stay an execution in light of an ‘appeal of the President,’ presenting freeranging assertions of foreign policy consequences, when those
assertions come unaccompanied by a persuasive legal claim.”119
However, Justice Scalia’s statement appears to be false—or at the
very least an overly narrow interpretation of prior Court precedent. The dissent asserted that the All Writs Act gives the Court
the power to take action to preserve its “potential jurisdiction,”
which it should have done in Leal Garcia’s case.120 Issuance of the
writ would have made the issue a federal one, thereby making the
Vienna Convention binding on the Supreme Court. Accordingly,
the Court would have been required to issue the stay and provide
Leal Garcia the rehearing following the mandate prescribed by
Avena.121
Had the Court asserted its potential jurisdiction, Congress
would have been forced to make a decision regarding Senator
Leahy’s bill—either signing the bill into law or voting it down.
Either way, the outcome of Leal Garcia would have been based on
Congressional intent rather than the Court’s divination of Congressional intent. The Court should have taken advantage of the
All Writs Act and issued a writ, and in so doing, forced Congress
to take an affirmative stance on the matter. By refusing to do so,
117. Id. (emphasis added).
118. Id. at 2870.
119. Id. at 2868 (internal citation omitted).
120. Id. at 2870. (“The All Writs Act empowers the federal courts to ‘issue all writs
necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions agreeable to the
usages and principles of law.’ The exercise of this power ‘is in the nature of appellate
jurisdiction’ where direct to an inferior court, and extends to the potential jurisdiction
of the appellate court where an appeal is not pending, but may later be perfected.”);
see also Hoffman, supra note 27, at 403 (noting that from 1990 through 1999, at least
twenty federal courts have allowed use of the All Writs Act as an independent basis
for removal); see also United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 172 (1977)
(Courts have consistently found that courts can issue commands under the All Writs
Act “as may be necessary or appropriate” to prevent frustration of orders and is
“designed to achieve the rational ends of law”).
121. Leal, 131 S. Ct. at 2870; see also Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Dean Foods Co., 384
U.S. 597, 603 (holding that the exercise of power under the All Writs Act to issue all
writs necessary or appropriate in aid of jurisdiction extends to the potential
jurisdiction of the appellate court where an appeal is not then pending but may be
later perfected).
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the Court supplanted the Executive’s responsibility and asserted
its own opinion as law.122

IV. RELATIONS
A.

WITH

MEXICO

United States-Mexican Foreign Relations

“Ever since Mexico and the United States established diplomatic relations, the two countries have been actively involved in
the protection of their nationals within the other’s territory.”123
Mexico and the United States first formally established diplomatic relations on December 12, 1822, when the United States
received Jose Manuel Zozaya, the Mexican Prime Minister, to the
United States.124 Mexico and the United States have collaborated
for over thirty years; in May of 1977, then-United States President Jimmy Carter and then-Mexican President José López Portillo established the U.S. Mexico Consultative Mechanism. This
eventually became the Binational Commission, a forum designed
to facilitate bilateral meetings between cabinet-level officials from
both countries.125
Former Mexican President Felipe Calderón actively promoted
international human rights and democracy, and sought to
increase Mexico’s participation in international affairs.”126 In
2007, then-United States President George W. Bush and thenMexican President Calderón announced that the two nations
would work alongside other Central American countries as part of
the Merida Initiative seeking to combat crime in the region.127 By
the end of 2010, the United States had appropriated over $1.5 billion for the Merida Initiative alone,128 seeming evidence of the
United States’ commitment to relations with Mexico. A byproduct
122. Id.
123. See Brief for the Gov’t. of the United Mex. States, supra note 30, at *3.
124. A Guide to the United States’ History of Recognition, Diplomatic, and Consular
Relations, by Country, since 1776: Mexico, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE: OFFICE OF THE
HISTORIAN, http://history.state.gov/countries/mexico (last visited Jan. 10, 2012).
125. U.S.-Mexico Binational Commission, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, http://www.
state.gov/p/wha/ci/mx/c10787.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2012).
126. Mexico: Government, BROAD COLL. OF BUS., http://globaledge.msu.edu/
countries/mexico/government (last visited Jan. 10, 2012).
127. Id.
128. See id.; see also Ranko Shiraki Oliver, In the Twelve Years of NAFTA, the
Treaty Gave to Me. . .What, Exactly: An Assessment of Economic, Social and Political
Developments in Mexico Since 1994 and Their Impact on Mexican Immigration into
the United States, 10 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 53, 64 (2007) (“In 1992, the year in which
NAFTA began, the United States already purchased approximately three-fourths of
Mexico’s imports, or over $35 billion.”).
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of this increased trade and interaction between the two nations
has been a higher occurrence of cross-border legal disputes,129
including on matters like consular representation.
A million American citizens live in Mexico and approximately
ten million Americans visit Mexico every year.130 Over a million
people cross the United States-Mexican border on a daily basis.131
A 2,000 mile-long shared border requires the two governments to
interact closely.132 The Border Liaison Mechanism was created in
1993 to aid the government in solving border-related issues.133
Chaired by the U.S. and Mexican consuls, the Border Liaison Mechanism operates in ‘sister city’ pairs and have
proven to be effective means of dealing with a variety of
local issues including border infrastructure, accidental violation of sovereignty by law enforcement officials, charges
of mistreatment of foreign nationals, and cooperation in
public health matters.134
Due to the high volume of people crossing each day, the United
States and Mexico must continue working together to protect their
specific domestic policies, and the security of the shared border.
However, if the United States continues to refuse to uphold its
treaty obligations to Mexico, the countries will be unable to work
together. This split may have an adverse effect on both countries’
economies, as well as the United States influence in the international sphere. . .

B.

Mexico and Texas Relations

Of the over 2000-mile border the United States and Mexico
share, 1200 miles is the Texas-Mexico border.135 While Texas is an
individual state, Texas and Mexico have taken steps to formally
recognize a relationship.136 The “State of Texas Mexico Office” has
existed within Mexico City since 1971.137 The Office “works to
strengthen trade, investment and tourism ties between Texas and
129. Robert M. Kossick, Jr., Litigation in the United States and Mexico: A
Comparative Overview, 31 INTER-AM. L. REV. 23, 24 (2000).
130. U.S. Relations with Mexico, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/
r/pa/ei/bgn/35749.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2012).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See Valencia, supra note 57, at 460.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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Mexico and ‘provides Texas businesses and communities with a
voice in Mexico, as well as contacts to facilitate doing business in
Mexico.’”138 Texas justifies its place in Mexico City with the following reasons:
As Texas’ closest foreign neighbor and partner in the North
America Free Trade Agreement, Mexico is the largest foreign market for Texas merchandise export. In 1998, Texas
merchandise exports to Mexico totaled $36.6 billion.
Roughly one-third of all Texas exports are destined for
Mexico. Moreover, Texas accounts for nearly half of total
U.S. export[s] to Mexico. Texas’ transportation infrastructure serves as the principal conduit for trade between Mexican and U.S. economic centers, and the state’s relationship
to Mexico is further strengthened by strong cultural and
historical ties.139
Further, the United States and Mexico often participate in “Border Governor Conferences” with Texas participating as one of the
five states from the United States, and one of ten total participant
states.140

V. THE COURT SHOULD HAVE ISSUED A WRIT
LEAL’S EXECUTION

AND

STAYED

Many government officials and citizens in Mexico strongly
opposed the death penalty in the United States and, more specifically, its application to Mexican nationals.141 In Aveda, the Court
had an available remedy that could have served the dual purposes
of saving a man’s life and satisfying the ICJ’s ruling.142 Issuing a
writ, well within the scope of the Supreme Court’s authority,
would have saved a man’s life and preserved both the United
States’ relations with Mexico and its worldwide reputation.143
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 461.
141. See Valencia, supra note 57, at 461.
142. See generally Brief for the Gov’t. of the United Mex. States, supra note 30, at
*7 (noting that in the ICJ, the United States government ferociously demands
consular access for its only citizens and implying that the United States would not
stand for the failure to fulfill the ICJ’s ruling if it were in the same position as Mexico
is in).
143. The United States has violated the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
several times with several different nations, thus affecting its worldwide reputation;
see Case Concerning Avena and Other Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar.
31).; see also LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27) (Germany); see
also Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.) 1998 I.C.J. 426 (Nov.
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Mexico has fully recognized the resulting double standard—the
United States will no doubt demand full compliance with the
Vienna Convention when Americans are detained without consular access in Mexico, but it will not provide the same right to Mexican citizens facing death in the United States.144
In the days following the Avena decision, then-President Bush
and then-Mexican President Vicente Fox had a seven-minute conversation, during which the two vowed to stay in close contact.
The United States and Mexico rely heavily on one another for
existence in today’s modern world.145 The United States’ inability
to provide Mexican citizens with what it calls “a basic human
right” has the potential to seriously impair relations with both
Mexico and the rest of the world.146 The dissenters in the Leal Garcia case were correct in recognizing what may potentially unfold
internationally.147 Both the Mexican and the United States federal
governments warned the Court about the potential negative consequences of its decision, but to no avail.148
“As a general matter, a treaty ‘depends for the enforcement of
its provisions on the interest and the honor of governments which
are parties to it.’ ”149 The execution of a second Mexican national
spreads the message that the United States has either little ability or little desire to follow the terms of its treaty obligations.150
Mexico warned the United States of the repercussions it faces, yet
the Court paid no mind.151 “Leal’s imminent execution ‘would seriously jeopardize the ability of the government of Mexico to continue working collaboratively with the United States on a number
of joint ventures, including extraditions, mutual judicial assis10) (Paraguay) (dismissed after the execution of the named defendant prior to a
decision rendered).
144. See generally Valencia, supra note 57; see also Brief for the Gov’t. of the United
Mex. States, supra note 30, at *7.
145. See U.S. Relations with Mexico, supra note 130 (“U.S. relations with Mexico
are important and complex. U.S. relations with Mexico have a direct impact on the
lives and livelihoods of millions of Americans—whether the issue is trade and
economic reform, homeland security, drug control, migration, or the environment.”).
146. See generally Leal Garcia v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 2866, 2866 (2011); see also Brief
for the Gov’t. of the United Mex. States, supra note 30, at *23.
147. See Brief for the Gov’t. of the United Mex. States, supra note 30, at *23.
148. See Leal Garcia, 131 S. Ct. at 2867 (2011).
149. See Alexander, supra note 53, at 825 (quoting Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct.
1346, 1357 (2008) (citing The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884)).
150. See Brief for the Gov’t. of the United Mex. States, Leal Garcia v. Texas, supra
note 30, at *16.
151. See generally id.
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tance, and [ ] efforts to strengthen the common border.’ ”152 The
threat of the death penalty being imposed upon Mexican nationals
detained in the U.S. is an issue that frequently plagues relations
between both countries and distracts from other pressing foreign
relations matters.153
“There is a panoply of public policy reasons why Texas should
comply with the Avena decision. . .the significance of maintaining
a strong Texas-Mexico relationship and the importance of fostering an international legal society.”154 By signing onto the Vienna
Convention and the Optional Protocol, the United States agreed to
follow the rules of that forum.155 In pulling out of the Optional Protocol, the United States is attempting to ignore its obligation, and
the Supreme Court’s failure to remedy the situation further demonstrates the egregiousness of the United States’ dereliction of its
international obligations.156 Prior to the Avena decision, the ICJ
“delivered clear judgments on consular notification[s] on two separate occasions, and the United States has either explicitly or
implicitly accepted its obligations to adhere to both decisions.”157
In the twenty-five years prior to the Avena decision, the
United States executed five Mexican nationals, all of whom had
been denied their right to consular assistance under the Vienna
Convention.158 When the Mexican Congress passed a joint resolution asking then-Texas Governor Rick Perry and then-President
Bush to halt the 2002 execution of Javier Suarez Medina, sixteen
foreign countries filed amicus briefs and requests for clemency for
Medina.159 In 2002, Oklahoma Governor Frank Keating denied
executive clemency, calling the Vienna Convention violations in
Gerardo Valdez’s (another Mexican national named in the Avena
decision) case, “harmless,” prompting Mexico to commence suit in
the ICJ on January 9, 2003.160 Mexico called the Governor’s
actions “ ‘contrary to international law’ and publicly vowed that it
would ‘take all available legal action[ ] in the United States, as
well as international tribunals . . . in order to preserve the life of
[its] fellow citizen[s] and obtain clemency.’ ”161
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Garcia, 131 S. Ct. at 2870 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
See Valencia, supra note 57, at 462.
Id. at 460.
See id. at 495.
See id.
See id.
See Ray, supra note 52, at 1758.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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As discussed, on June 14, 2011, Senator Patrick Leahy, a
Democratic Senator from Vermont, introduced S.1194: Consular
Notification Compliance Act of 2011.162 The Committee of the
Judiciary held hearings regarding the bill on July 27, 2011.163 Senator Leahy’s bill facilitates compliance with Article 36 of the
Vienna Convention for Consular Relations.164 As proposed, the bill
provides:
“[A]ny comparable provision of a bilateral international
agreement addressing consular notification and access, if
an individual who is not a national of the United States is
detained or arrested by an officer or employee of the Federal Government or a State or local government, the arresting or detaining officer or employee, or other appropriate
officer or employee of the Federal Government or a State or
local government, shall notify the individual without delay
that the individual may request that the consulate of the
foreign state of which the individual is a national be notified of the detention or arrest.”165
The goal of the act is to ensure the detained individual has
the ongoing ability to communicate freely with and be visited by
the consulate office.166 Additionally, the Compliance Act gives federal courts jurisdiction to review the merits of a petition claiming
a violation of Article 36(1)(b) or (c) of the Vienna Convention or a
comparable provision of a bilateral international agreement
addressing consular notification and access, filed by an individual
convicted and sentenced to death by any federal or state court
before the date of the enactment of the act.167 “If the date for the
execution of an individual. . .has been set, the court shall grant a
stay of execution if necessary to allow the court to review a petition. . .”168 However, a petitioner must show actual prejudice to
their criminal conviction as a result of this violation in order to be
successful.169
Issuance of the writ would have allowed Leal to live while
simultaneously pressuring Congress to deciding whether to pass
162. See Consular Notification Compliance Act of 2011, S.1194, 112th Cong. (2011),
GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s112-1194 (last visited
October 13, 2011).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See id.
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Senator Leahy’s initiative. Several other nations have complained
about, and even brought suit against, the United States for similar consular violations. By issuing the writ, the Court would have
forced the Senate to determine their position on the matter once
and for all: either satisfy the ICJ’s ruling in Avena or have an
international reputation as a world power that does not fulfill its
treaty obligations. “Maintaining the status quo is a modest price
to pay to ensure that the United States fulfills its international
obligations and retains its position on the world stage as a desired
treaty partner.”170

VI. CONCLUSION
In executing Leal Garcia, the United States has begun its
descent down a very slippery slope. The Supreme Court’s failure
to issue a writ under the All Writs Act enables the United States
to sign treaties and essentially hide behind its Constitution when
it does not wish to follow the rules. Undoubtedly, the United
States remains the world’s hegemonic super power. However, continued intransigence by the United States regarding its international commitments, both treaty-based and otherwise, will not
only undermine foreign relations with Mexico, but may also
severely impact the credibility and influence that define successful foreign relations with all other nations.

170. See Brief for the Gov’t. of the United Mex. States, supra note 30, at *23.

